The Battle of Gallipoli took place at Gallipoli from April 1915 to January 1916 during the First World War. A joint British and French operation was mounted in an effort to eventually capture the Ottoman capital of Constantinople (now Istanbul). The attempt failed, with heavy casualties on both sides but it was a valuable lesson to both sides and they learned from the confrontation. In Turkey, the campaign is known as the Çanakkale Savaşları, after the province of Çanakkale. In the United Kingdom, it is called the Dardanelles Campaign or Gallipoli, and in France, Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland it is also known simply as “Gallipoli.”

BACKGROUND: Russia, one of the Allied powers during the First World War, had a limited industrial base with which to supply its potentially vast armed forces. France and Great Britain, with smaller populations but much greater industrial resources, were eager to provide Russia with munitions to relieve pressure on the Western Front. The Allies struggled throughout the war to open an effective supply route to Russia and China. The German Empire and Austria-Hungary blocked Russia's land trade routes to Europe, while no easy sea route existed. The White Sea in the north and the Sea of Okhotsk in the Far East were distant from the Eastern Front and often bound by ice. The Baltic Sea was blocked by Germany's formidable Kaiserliche Marine. The Black Sea's only entrance was through the Bosphorus, which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in October 1914, Russia could no longer be supplied from the Mediterranean Sea.
By late 1914 the Western Front, in France and Belgium, had effectively become fixed. A new front was desperately needed. Also, the Allies hoped that an attack on the Ottomans would draw Bulgaria and Greece into the war on the Allied side. However, an early proposal to use Greek troops to invade the Gallipoli peninsula was vetoed by Russia.
A first proposal to attack Turkey had already been suggested by a French minister in November 1914, but it was not supported. A suggestion by British Naval Intelligence to bribe the Turks over to the Allied side was not taken up.
Later in November, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill put forward his first plans for a naval attack on the Dardanelles. He reasoned that the Royal Navy had a large number of obsolete battleships which could not be used against the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, but which might well be made useful in another theatre. Initially, the attack was to be made by the Royal Navy alone, with only token forces from the army being required for routine occupation tasks.
A plan for an attack and invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula was eventually approved by the British cabinet in January 1915.

START OF THE CAMPAIGN: On 19 February, the first attack on the Dardanelles began when a strong Anglo-French task force, including the British battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, bombarded Turkish artillery along the coast. (Map of the Dardanelles defences)
A new attack was launched on 18 March, targeted at the narrowest point of the Dardanelles where the straits were just a mile wide. A massive fleet under the command of Admiral de Robeck containing no fewer than 16 battleships tried to advance through the Dardanelles. However almost all of the fleet was damaged by sea mines which were laid along the Asian shore by the Turkish minelayer Nusret. Trawlermen had been used by the British as minesweepers. However they retreated as the Turks opened fire on them, leaving the mines. The fleet was sent in anyway and three battleships were sunk (HMS Ocean and HMS Irresistible and the French Bouvet), while the battlecruiser HMS Inflexible and the French battleships Suffren and Gaulois were badly damaged.
These losses prompted the Allies to cease any further attempts to force the straits by naval power alone. The defeat of the British fleet had also given the Turks a morale boost. The Turkish gunners had almost run out of ammunition before the British fleet retreated. If the British had pushed forward with the naval attack, as Churchill suggested, then Gallipoli may not have been so great a defeat.
But then again it is not clear how they could win even if they passed. Naval force alone would not be sufficient to capture Istanbul and the navy could be trapped in the sea of Marmara.

INVASION: After the failure of the naval attacks, it had become clear that ground forces were necessary to eliminate the Turkish mobile artillery. This would allow minesweepers to clear the waters for the larger vessels. The British Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force that was to carry out the mission.
In early 1915, Australian and New Zealand volunteer soldiers were encamped in Egypt, undergoing training prior to being sent to France. The infantry were formed into the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), which comprised the Australian 1st Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division. General Hamilton also had the regular British 29th Division, the British 10th Division from Kitchener's New Army, the Royal Naval Division (RND) (Royal Marines and hastily drafted naval recruits) and the French Oriental Expeditionary Corps (including four Senegalese battalions) under his command.
There was a delay of over six weeks before many of the troops arrived from Britain. This gave the Turkish forces time to prepare for a land assault. There was little security or secrecy in Egypt, and the intended destination of Hamilton's force was widely known. The Turks quickly replenished their stocks of ammunition and other supplies.
Hamilton's invasion force was opposed by the Turkish Fifth Army, under the command of the German advisor to the Ottoman Army, General Otto Liman von Sanders. The Fifth Army, which had to defend both shores of the Dardanelles, comprised six of the best Turkish divisions totaling 84,000 men. At Bulair, near the neck of the peninsula, were the Turkish 5th and 7th divisions. At Cape Helles, on the tip of the peninsula, and along the Aegean coast, was the Ninth Division and, in reserve at Gaba Tepe in the middle of the peninsula was the 19th Division, under the command of Mustafa Kemal. Defending the Asian shore at Kum Kale, which lies at the entrance to the Dardanelles, were the 3rd and 11th divisions. (Map of the Turkish forces)
The invasion plan of 25 April 1915 was for the 29th Division to land at Helles on the tip of the peninsula and then advance upon the forts at Kilitbahir. The Anzacs were to land north of Gaba Tepe on the Aegean coast from where they could advance across the peninsula and prevent retreat from or reinforcement of Kilitbahir. The French made a diversionary landing at Kum Kale on the Asian shore. There was also a one-man diversion by Bernard Freyberg of the RND at Bulair.

CAPE HELLES: The Helles landing was made by the 29th Division under the command of Major-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, on five beaches in an arc about the tip of the peninsula, designated from east to west as S, V, W, X and Y beach. (Map over Cape Helles)
The commander of the Y Beach landing was able to walk unopposed to within 500 metres of Krithia village, which was deserted. The British never got so close again. Y Beach was eventually evacuated the following day as Turkish reinforcements arrived.
The main landings were made at V Beach, beneath the old Seddülbahir fortress, and at W Beach, a short distance to the west on the other side of the Helles headland.
At V Beach the covering force from the Royal Munster Fusiliers and Royal Hampshires was landed from a converted collier, SS River Clyde, which was run aground beneath the fortress so that the troops could disembark directly via ramps to the shore. The Royal Dublin Fusiliers would land at V Beach from open boats. At W Beach the Lancashire Fusiliers also landed in open boats on a small beach overlooked by dunes and obstructed with barbed wire. On both beaches the Turkish defenders were in a position to inflict appalling casualties on the landing infantry. The troops emerging one by one from the sally ports on the River Clyde presented perfect targets to the machine guns in the Seddülbahir fort. Out of the first 200 soldiers to disembark, only 21 men made it onto the beach.
As at Anzac, the Turkish defenders were too few to force the British off the beach. At W Beach, thereafter known as Lancashire Landing, the Lancashires were able to overwhelm the defences despite their dreadful losses, 600 killed or wounded out of a total strength of 1000. The battalions that landed at V Beach suffered about 70% casualties. Six awards of the Victoria Cross were made amongst the Lancashires at W Beach. Six Victoria Crosses were also awarded amongst the infantry and sailors at the V Beach landing and a further three were awarded the following day as they finally fought their way off the beach. After the landings, there were so few of the Dublin Fusiliers and Munster Fusiliers left that they were amalgamated into one unit, "The Dubsters". Only one Dubliner officer survived the landing; overall, of the 1,012 Dubliners who landed, only 11 would survive the entire Gallipoli campaign unscathed.

EARLY BATTLES: On the afternoon of 27 April Kemal launched a concerted attack to drive the Anzacs back to the beach. With the support of naval gunfire, the Turks were held off throughout the night.
On 28 April, the British, now supported by the French on the right of the line, intended to capture Krithia in what became known as the First Battle of Krithia. The plan of attack was overly complex and poorly communicated to the commanders in the field. The troops of the 29th Division were still exhausted and unnerved by the battle for the beaches and for Seddülbahir village, captured after heavy fighting on the 26th. The attack ground to a halt around 6pm with a gain of some ground but the objective of Krithia village was not reached. After the battle, the Allied trenches lay about halfway between the Helles headland and Krithia village. With Turkish opposition stiffening by the day, the opportunity for the anticipated swift victory on the peninsula was disappearing. Helles, like Anzac, became a siege. Strong Turkish counter-attacks on the nights of 1 May and 3 May were repulsed despite breaking through the French defences.
The first attempt at an offensive at Anzac took place on the evening of 2 May when New Zealand and Australian Division commander, General Godley, ordered the Australian 4th Infantry Brigade, commanded by General John Monash, and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, to attack from Russell's Top and Quinn's Post towards Baby 700. The troops advanced a short distance during the night and tried to dig in to hold their gains but were forced to retreat by the night of 3 May, having suffered about 1,000 casualties.
Believing Anzac to be secure, Hamilton moved two brigades, the Australian Second Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, to the Helles front as reserves for the Second Battle of Krithia starting on 6 May. This was the first major assault at Helles and gained about a quarter of a mile on a wide front at the now customary enormous cost in casualties.
The Turks launched a major assault at Anzac on 19 May — 42,000 Turks attacked 10,000 Australians and New Zealanders — but the attack tragically miscarried. Lacking sufficient artillery and ammunition, the Turks relied on surprise and weight of numbers for success but their preparations were detected and the defenders were ready. When it was over the Turks had suffered about 10,000 casualties. In comparison, the Australian casualties were a mere 160 killed and 468 wounded. The Turkish losses were so severe that a truce was organized for 24 May in order to bury the large numbers of dead lying in no man's land.
The Sphinx, one of the battlefield's most distinctive physical landmarks.
In May the British naval artillery advantage was diminished following the torpedoing of the battleships HMS Goliath on 13 May, HMS Triumph on 25 May and HMS Majestic on 27 May. After these losses much of the battleship support was withdrawn and those remaining would fire while under way, reducing their accuracy and effectiveness.
In the Third Battle of Krithia on 4 June all thought of a decisive breakthrough was gone and the plans for battle had reverted to trench warfare with objectives being measured in hundreds of metres. Casualties ran to around 25% for both sides; the British suffering 4,500 from an attacking force of 20,000.
In June, a fresh division, the 52nd Division, began to land at Helles in time to participate in the last of the major Helles battles, the Battle of Gully Ravine which was launched on 28 June. This battle advanced the British line along the left (Aegean) flank of the battlefield which resulted in a rare but limited victory for the Allies. Between 1 July and 5 July the Turks launched a series of desperate counter-attacks against the new British line but failed to regain the lost ground. Their casualties for the period were horrendous, estimated at in excess of 14,000.
One final British action was made at Helles on 12 July before the Allied main effort was shifted north to Anzac. Two fresh brigades from the 52nd Division were thrown into an attack in the centre of the line along Achi Baba Nullah (known as Bloody Valley) and sustained 30% casualties without making any significant progress.

AUGUST OFFENSIVE: The repeated failure of the Allies to capture Krithia or make any progress on the Helles front led Hamilton to pursue a new plan for the campaign which resulted in what is now called the Battle of Sari Bair. On the night of 6 August a fresh landing of two infantry divisions was to be made at Suvla, five miles north of Anzac. Meanwhile at Anzac a strong assault would be made on the Sari Bair range by breaking out into the rough and thinly defended terrain north of the Anzac perimeter.
The landing at Suvla Bay was only lightly opposed but the British commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford, had so diluted his early objectives that little more than the beach was seized. Once again the Turks were able to win the race for the high ground of the Anafarta Hills thereby rendering the Suvla front another case of static trench warfare.
The offensive was preceded on the evening of 6 August by diversionary assaults at Helles and Anzac. At Helles, the diversion at Krithia Vineyard became another futile battle with no gains and heavy casualties for both sides. At Anzac, an attack on the Turkish trenches at Lone Pine by the infantry brigades of the Australian 1st Division was a rare victory for the Anzacs. However, the main assault aimed at the peaks of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 was less successful.
The force striking for the nearer peak of Chunuk Bair comprised the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. It came within 500 metres of the peak by dawn on 7 August but was not able to seize the summit until the following morning. This delay had fatal consequences for another supporting attack on the morning of 7 August; that of the Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek which was to coincide with the New Zealanders attacking back down from Chunuk Bair against the rear of the Turkish defences. The New Zealanders held out on Chunuk Bair for two days before relief was provided by two New Army battalions from the Wiltshire and Loyal North Lancashire Regiments. A massive Turkish counter-attack, led in person by Mustafa Kemal, swept these two battalions from the heights.
Another planned attack on Hill 971 never took place. The attacking force of the Australian 4th Infantry Brigade (General Monash), and an Indian Brigade, were defeated by the terrain and became lost during the night. All subsequent attempts to resume the attack were easily repulsed by the Turkish defenders at great cost to the Allies.
The Suvla landing was reinforced by the arrival of the British 53rd and 54th Divisions plus the dismounted yeomanry of the 2nd Mounted Division. The unfortunate 29th Division was also shifted from Helles to Suvla for one more push. The final British attempt to resuscitate the offensive came on 21 August with attacks at Scimitar Hill and Hill 60. Control of these hills would have united the Anzac and Suvla fronts but neither battle achieved success. When fighting at Hill 60 ceased on 29 August, the battle for the Sari Bair heights, and indeed the battle for the peninsula, was effectively over.

EVACUATION: Following the failure of the August Offensive, the Gallipoli campaign entered a hiatus while the future direction was debated. The persistent lack of progress was finally making an impression in the United Kingdom as contrasting news of the true nature of the campaign was smuggled out by journalists like Keith Murdoch and Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett discrediting Hamilton's performance. Disaffected senior officers such as General Stopford also contributed to the general air of gloom. The prospect of evacuation was raised on 11 October 1915 but Hamilton resisted the suggestion, fearing the damage to British prestige. He was dismissed as commander shortly afterwards and replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro.
The situation was complicated by the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers. On 5 October 1915 the British opened a second Mediterranean front at Salonika which would compete for reinforcements with Gallipoli. Also Germany would now have a direct land route to Turkey, enabling it to supply heavy siege artillery which would devastate the Allied trench network, especially on the confined front at Anzac.
Having reviewed the state of his command, Monro recommended evacuation. Kitchener disliked the notion of evacuating the peninsula and made a personal visit to consult with the commanders of the three corps; VIII Corps at Helles, IX Corps at Suvla and ANZAC. The decision to evacuate was made.
Evacuation of 14 divisions in winter in proximity to the enemy would be difficult and heavy losses were expected. The untenable nature of the Allied position was made apparent when a heavy storm struck on 27 November 1915 and lasted for three days. There followed a blizzard at Suvla in early December. The rain flooded trenches, drowning soldiers and washing unburied corpses into the lines. The following snow killed more men from exposure.
Ironically the evacuation was the greatest Allied success of the campaign. Suvla and Anzac were to be evacuated in late December, the last troops leaving before dawn on 20 December 1915. Troop numbers had been progressively reduced since 7 December 1915 and cunning ruses were performed to fool the Turks and prevent them discovering that the Allies were departing. At Anzac, the troops would maintain utter silence for an hour or more until the curious Turks would venture out to inspect the trenches, whereupon the Anzacs would open fire. As the numbers in the trenches were thinned, rifles were rigged to fire by water dripped into a pan attached to the trigger.
Helles was retained in case the British wanted to resume the offensive. However, a decision to evacuate there too was made on 27 December. The Turks were now warned of the likelihood of evacuation and mounted an attack on 6 January 1916 but were repulsed. The last British troops departed from Lancashire Landing on 9 January 1916. The Gallipoli Campaign was over...
(SOURCE = Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gallipoli - February 1st 2007)