

# **EXTENDED ESSAY**

**Why did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)  
collapse despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introducing  
a series of reform programs (1985-1991)?**

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## Introduction

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was in 1985 appointed as the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). During his reign, Gorbachev implemented several radical reforms, notably uskorenie, perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiya. Though not yet the president of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's position as General Secretary allowed him to rule the USSR as its government were members of the CPSU and responded to party discipline.<sup>1</sup> Despite Gorbachev's attempt to reform the Soviet economy and society, his era as a political leader is associated with one of the most significant events of modern history: the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This brings us to the research question: **why did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapse despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introducing a series of reform programs (1985-1991)?**

In the process of answering the research question, Gorbachev's main reforms will be examined and their economic, social and political consequences. To contrast, factors contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union will also be examined. This will include the economic consequences of the second economy, oil price, and grain reliance. As well as the economic, social and political consequences of the Soviet-Afghan War and the political drawback of the August Coup. The subsequent discussion will establish whether the aforementioned factors of Soviet collapse were mutually exclusive or not. The discussion will also in greater detail explore how the main reforms of Gorbachev contributed to the collapse rather than preventing it. Finally, the conclusion will address the research question and new questions that may have emerged.

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<sup>1</sup> Galeotti p.6

## Gorbachev's main reforms

### Uskorenie

Uskorenie, or acceleration, was Gorbachev's attempt between 1985 to 1987 to reform the economy by increasing the efficiency and productivity of industries and workers. Uskorenie entailed three notable processes that contributed to economic decline: increasing production targets, gospriemka which entailed a state quality control inspectorate, and the anti-alcohol campaign. The increase of production targets was featured in the 1986-90 Five Year Plan calling for an annual increase of national income by 4.1 percent, which was well above preceding levels.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, Gorbachev attempted to decentralize the Soviet planned economy. First was the law of enterprise enacted in 1987 as an attempt to grant workers greater autonomy, enforcing that of initiating their own production, and the ability to elect its managers.<sup>3</sup> Gorbachev however created no free-market to coordinate the economy, thus not creating an incentive for industries to initiate their own production, and industries were unable to attain the production targets as Gorbachev did not modernize the industry as he could not finance new training, plants, or technology.<sup>4</sup> This contributed to the budget deficit of the Soviet Union, reaching that of 45.5 billion rubles in 1985 to 93 billion in 1988.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, economic growth fell from 4 percent in 1986 to 1.3 percent in 1987.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid p.56

<sup>3</sup> Ibid p.75

<sup>4</sup> Ibid p.84-85

<sup>5</sup> McCauley pp.400-401

The inability of the Soviet industry to increase production targets could as well be attributed to the *gospriemka* campaign of 1987. Products of inferior quality that previously were dumped on the Soviet market were now rejected by inspectors and the factory and its workers were possibly penalized for inadequate output. The rejected output was not accounted for as factories did not have sufficient materials to make up for the rejected downfall as a result of the budget deficit.<sup>6</sup>

In a further attempt to improve efficiency, Gorbachev endorsed an anti-alcohol campaign to reduce sales and production of alcohol to minimize alcoholism and improve worker productivity. The result was a 67 billion revenue loss equivalent to 9 percent of the Soviet GNP.<sup>7</sup> In 1985, the state's alcohol monopoly was responsible for almost 14 percent of its budget revenues. The loss of revenue put further pressure on the state budget which contributed to Gorbachev's inability to modernize the Soviet industry, and for factories to compensate for the output rejected as a result of *gospriemka*.

## **Perestroika**

Gorbachev initiated in 1988 economic reform through *perestroika*, translated as restructuring, as an attempt to restructure the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union up to this point had been a command economy subject to government control and that of party rule. *Perestroika* was intended to reform the Soviet economy through decentralization and introduce aspects of the free market economy. Gorbachev pushed for privatization of state-owned businesses, undermining public ownership

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<sup>6</sup> Galeotti p.56

<sup>7</sup> McCauley pp.400-401

and central planning, and withdrawing the CPSU's monopoly over the Soviet economy.<sup>8</sup> The consequences of the attempted decentralization were the removal of price controls resulting in inflation and the ability of republics to withhold their production to protect their economic interests.

The Soviet Union had previously maintained artificially low prices through price controls, while suffering that of shortages, and therefore possessing inflationary pressure. Adjacent to the reduction of price controls was the annual rise of inflation: 7.3 percent in 1987; 8.4 percent in 1988; 10.5 percent in 1989; 53.6 percent in 1990.<sup>9</sup> The Soviet Union nonetheless embarked on an additional price reform to bring the economy to equilibrium by increasing official prices and removing several price controls altogether in April of 1991.<sup>10</sup> The same year, inflation rates rose to 650-700 percent.<sup>11</sup>

Consequently, separatism was reinforced within the republics. Previously the republics of the USSR had specific divisions of labor and specialization. Instead, perestroika encouraged decentralization and independent action. A notable example is that of the law on cooperatives of 1988 which legalized a wide range of small businesses to set their own prices and be considered independent of the Five Year Plan.<sup>12</sup> Parts of the republics were now enabled to act in their own interest by being exempt from the production quota. As a result of economic uncertainty, the republics withheld their production in an attempt to protect their economic interest.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.141

<sup>9</sup> Strayer p.135

<sup>10</sup> Ibid p.136

<sup>11</sup> Ibid p.135

<sup>12</sup> Galeotti p.75

<sup>13</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.166

## Glasnost

The policy of glasnost, known as transparency, introduced freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and government transparency.<sup>14</sup> This reform was especially radical, essentially allowing for greater individual and collective freedom for Soviet citizens.<sup>15</sup> Gorbachev initiated glasnost to encourage debate and create agitation for change and therefore strengthen the foundation of perestroika; which was reform.<sup>16</sup> However, glasnost had unprecedented consequences: criticism towards the Soviet government, the emergence of separatist movements, and thus loss of political cohesion.

Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy researcher Pravda considered glasnost as starting the nationalist ball of 1987-1988; in other words, creating a foundation for separatism among the nationalities.<sup>17</sup> Glasnost entailed the reduction of controlled means of communication, access to non-governmental organizations and foreign governments.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, ethnic protests since the year 1988 became more frequent and organized; the rise of separatist movements in the Baltic states and Georgia as of 1989, and protests swept over Belarus and Ukraine.<sup>19</sup> Historian Archie Brown attributed these separatist movements to the elaborate discussion of past persecution towards the republics by the Soviet state, and as a result of glasnost - people were less afraid to speak up towards these injustices.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Brown pp.350-351

<sup>15</sup> Galeotti p.73

<sup>16</sup> Pravda p.3

<sup>17</sup> Ibid p.3

<sup>18</sup> Ibid p.8

<sup>19</sup> Ibid p.3

<sup>20</sup> Brown p.291

Previously, the Soviet government had responded to ethnic protests and movements by military intervention. However, glasnost demanding transparency of the Soviet government towards its western counterparts gave foreign statesmen a chance to encourage Gorbachev to respond by political means rather than intervention.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, Gorbachev refrained from interfering when former Communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact began striving for independence.<sup>22</sup>

The refusal of the Soviet government to respond by means of coercion resulted in countries previously under Soviet control becoming independent and reinforcing the idea that a state autonomous from Moscow was possible. Visibly the cohesion of the union was deteriorating. A notable example was that of Moscow refusing to interfere in Poland and Hungary which established Gorbachev's commitment to the avoidance of force and encouraged nationalist leaders the possibility that Gorbachev would not respond by coercive action even within the USSR.<sup>23</sup>

## **Demokratizatsiya**

Demokratizatsiya, or democratization, was a policy accompanying perestroika and glasnost implemented in 1987 by Gorbachev as an attempt to introduce political participation into the system. The policy was not intended to execute a full transition to western-style democracy or free and fair elections but rather an attempt to free more aspects of Soviet society from ideological control and the opportunity for

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<sup>21</sup> Pravda p.8

<sup>22</sup> Brown p.288

<sup>23</sup> Pravda p.9

citizens to affect party policy.<sup>24</sup> To understand Gorbachev's intentions in implementing such a policy, the purpose of glasnost has to be examined.

Accompanying glasnost, Gorbachev encouraged political debate and criticism towards reform policy. Another perspective on the intention of glasnost was Gorbachev's attempt to establish political legitimacy in the media, further strengthening support for reform. Political debate in favor of reform policy, therefore, strengthened perestroika, and open debate could lend party members insight upon how to improve perestroika.

The policy of demokratizatsiya could be analyzed from a similar perspective. Though multi-party and western-style elections were not yet implemented, demokratizatsiya allowed for elections between candidates approved by the Communist party.<sup>25</sup> To understand why these elections were significant, party pluralism did not yet exist in Soviet politics, however, the Communist Party was not unified by the same principles. Different factions within the party had different approaches to politics, policy, and attitudes towards perestroika. Gorbachev's faction involved those in favor of perestroika and reform.

Demokratizatsiya was therefore regarded as Gorbachev's attempt to secure political legitimacy if his faction was to secure the popular vote. The party would therefore be in line with Gorbachev's ideas and the popular mandate.<sup>26</sup> However, this did not occur. Glasnost had already stimulated separatist movements within the republics in their strive for independence. The policy of demokratizatsiya introducing elements of

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<sup>24</sup> Galeotti p.87

<sup>25</sup> Brown p.202

<sup>26</sup> Galeotti p.88

pluralism and democracy<sup>27</sup>, such as union-wide elections for republican legislatures in 1990<sup>28</sup>, proposed the opportunity to vote for those in support of the national cause.<sup>29</sup>

By 1989, two years after demokratizatsiya was implemented, republics within the USSR had already declared sovereignty, though this did not indicate a formal secession from the Union. Demokratizatsiya also abolished in 1990 article 6 of the Soviet constitution and thus removed the leading role of the communist party.<sup>30</sup> Following the abolishment of article 6, actual declarations of independence began with Lithuania and Latvia in 1990. In the following year, the remaining republics including Russia declared independence.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Brown p.200

<sup>28</sup> Ibid p.205

<sup>29</sup> Ibid p.291

<sup>30</sup> Brown p.219

<sup>31</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.212

## Factors contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union

### The Second Economy

A common misconception about the Soviet Union is that the economy relied on a planned economy with an absence of a free market. This statement is accurate in regards to the 'official economy'. However, a part of the Soviet economy often overlooked is that of the black market also known as the 'second economy'. The phenomenon was not exclusive to the Gorbachev era and had instead expanded vastly during the Brezhnev era of the 1970s as a result of lacking consumer goods.<sup>32</sup>

The second economy existed on several levels. On the wholesale level, managers exchanged products among themselves, exchanged workers, or reported products as rejects and instead used them to barter for supplies. On the contrary, the retail level consisted of the resale of state property and managers putting aside high-quality products to sell them 'under the counter' and as a result, the long waiting lists for high-demand products such as cars and apartments for consumers were avoided.<sup>33</sup>

Deciding upon a figure to determine the extent of the second economy is difficult. Keeran & Kenny estimated that the value of the second economy was approximately 3.4 percent of national income in 1960, 20 percent in 1988, and 12.8 percent in 1990, with the sharp reduction being a previously illegal activity that was now legal as a result of Gorbachev's economic reforms.<sup>34</sup> The extent of the second economy

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<sup>32</sup> Strayer p.67

<sup>33</sup> Ibid p.66

<sup>34</sup> Keeran & Kenny p. 72

undermined the party's legitimacy and economic system. Gregory Grossman, a leading scholar on the economy of the Soviet Union, regarded the second economy as a living example of an alternative to the official centralized-planned-command system.<sup>35</sup>

Through the second economy, citizens could obtain goods and services that the state could not provide, and thus a substantial sector of the economy slipped outside that of official control. The second economy especially entrenched itself within the republics. The result was rampant corruption as large-scale operations were established between economic managers and even within the party apparatus.<sup>36</sup> Reportedly, these crime-infested enterprises by the end of 1988 employed a million hired workers and in the following year five million workers.<sup>37</sup>

As a result, the second economy had an impact on the budget deficit. With such a flourishing black market, state expenditures were not matched by state revenues, as an increasing amount of subsidies were provided to unprofitable enterprises involved in the second economy.<sup>38</sup>

## **Oil Price and Grain Reliance**

During the 20th century, the Soviet Union relied heavily on bulk sales of oil for their hard currency. In 1983 as a result of pressure from the US, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries reduced the price of oil a barrel from \$34 to \$29.

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<sup>35</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.139

<sup>36</sup> Strayer p.67

<sup>37</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.139

<sup>38</sup> Strayer p.136

Additionally, Saudi Arabia increased in 1985 its oil production from 2 million barrels a day to 9 million barrels, resulting in a price reduction of oil to \$12 a barrel within five months. This benefited the US economy by their ability to sell military supplies to Saudi Arabia in exchange for greater oil production and lower prices. However, this devastated the Soviet economy and caused a loss of \$10 billion in valuable hard currency.<sup>39</sup>

As a result of the decline of energy export revenues, the Soviet Union was unable to pay for the agricultural imports it relied upon from the West.<sup>40</sup> Agriculture had become a weakness of the Soviet economy as the quality and availability of food products declined as rapid urbanization occurred in the Soviet Union. The consequences of inefficient agriculture and reliance on grain imports were further economic strain. Reportedly the urban population rose from 39 to 63 percent of the population between the years 1950 and 1980. The agricultural sector could not keep up with the demand as urbanization resulted in a rise in living standards and thus greater food consumption.<sup>41</sup> The inefficiency of agriculture stemmed from poor distribution, rudimentary storage, and rudimentary refrigeration facilities, which resulted in the wastage of supplies.<sup>42</sup>

As a result, the Soviet Union became increasingly reliant on grain imports. In 1974 the wheat imports amounted to 2,500,000 metric tons and increased to a staggering 28,100,000 metric tons in 1984.<sup>43</sup> The food prices also kept rising, reportedly 18

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<sup>39</sup> Keeran & Kenny pp. 92-93

<sup>40</sup> Pravda p.20

<sup>41</sup> Lane p.46

<sup>42</sup> Ibid p.48

<sup>43</sup> United States Department of Agriculture

percent higher in 1990 than in 1989, and subsequently, there were acute shortages in state shops, and queuing became widespread.<sup>44</sup>

## **Soviet-Afghan War**

The Soviet-Afghan War had initially been in 1979 a soviet intervention to stabilize an imposed pro-soviet government.<sup>45</sup> The scale of the war in Afghanistan spanned over a decade, involved almost a million Soviet troops and tens of thousands of casualties.<sup>46</sup> The war contributed to further strain on the economy, caused social unrest across the Union, and resulted in a deterioration of Soviet-US relations. The military intervention became increasingly an economic burden as the US made efforts to support Afghan resistance and encouraged Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China to send them aid. The Soviet military effort to protect the revolutionary Afghan pro-soviet government against American-supported opposition cost around \$3 to \$4 billion a year.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet-Afghan War also caused social unrest across the republics of Central Asia in the Soviet Union. The country of Afghanistan consisted primarily of three ethnic groups: Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Pashtuns. Both Uzbeks and Tajiks were prominent ethnic groups within the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup> The public opposition also infected party officials of Central Asia resulting in purges by Moscow, further exacerbating civil

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<sup>44</sup> Lane p.49

<sup>45</sup> Strayer p.129

<sup>46</sup> Reuveny & Prakash p.4

<sup>47</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.92

<sup>48</sup> Reuveny & Prakash p.12

unrest. Anti-war demonstrations occurred in 1982 in Tajikistan, 1985 in Armenia and Astrakhan, and anti-purge protests in Kazakhstan in 1986.<sup>49</sup>

The social consequences were not only evident within the republics of Central Asia. Reportedly 469,685 soldiers, which exceeded 70 percent of the total, became either sick or injured. The Soviet military experience in the Soviet-Afghan War was slow and attritional while the soldiers who returned home became shunned by the public. As glasnost allowed for greater freedom of speech, troubled soldiers began to share their disappointment in the war effort which led to a deterioration of the population's confidence in the Soviet society as a whole.<sup>50</sup> In other words, it became a metaphor for systemic problems.<sup>51</sup> As the public became increasingly disaffectionate towards the Soviet government, especially as the war galvanized opposition across the republics of Central Asia, the deterioration of political cohesion across the Union became visible.

The Soviet-Afghan War was not only detrimental to the economy and cohesion of the Union but also had political consequences. The Soviet intervention contributed to the deterioration of Soviet-US relations and attracted further concern and condemnation from Washington.<sup>52</sup> Gorbachev himself argued that the war buried the possibility of improving international relations for a long time.<sup>53</sup> However, the deterioration had already begun years before Gorbachev became General Secretary. In response to the intervention, the US imposed an embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union in 1980 and boycotted the Moscow-hosted Olympics in the same year. This was

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid p.12

<sup>50</sup> Fremont-Barnes p.85

<sup>51</sup> Ibid p.86

<sup>52</sup> Brown p.266-267

<sup>53</sup> Gorbachev p.186

adjacent to the issue of nuclear disarmament being on the agendas of the US and Soviet Union when improving relations was necessary.

When Gorbachev was elected General Secretary in March 1985, he declared in October the same year that it was time to withdraw from Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup> The Geneva Accords were signed on the 14th of April 1988 by which the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, Soviet-US relations improved as the Washington summit in 1987 achieved the previously considered 'unrealistic' goal of eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons and removing several US and Soviet missiles that had been deployed in Western Europe.<sup>56</sup>

Albeit the US-Soviet relations improved, the Soviet-Afghan War served as an example of how the Soviet Union became increasingly subjective to foreign pressure and unable to maintain its sphere of influence as the military spending became increasingly detrimental to the economy. At the same time, the Soviet-Afghan War galvanized opposition across Central Asia and exacerbated the loss of political cohesion across the Soviet Union.

## **The August Coup**

The August Coup was a failed attempt by communist-hardliners of the military and KGB to seize power from Gorbachev in 1991. Historian Knight argued that the coup accelerated the disintegration of the Soviet Union<sup>57</sup> by tilting the power away from

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<sup>54</sup> Fremont-Barnes p.79

<sup>55</sup> Ibid p.81

<sup>56</sup> Brown p.269

<sup>57</sup> Knight p.27

Gorbachev to republican politician Boris Yeltsin who intervened against the coup attempt and emerged as a hero.<sup>58</sup> Yeltsin had previously been elected as Russian president in June of 1991 and was able to successfully transfer power to the republics and thus his success pushed Gorbachev out of his position as a political leader.<sup>59</sup> The August Coup served as the final catalyst to the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, it is important to consider that the cohesion of the Union had already been undermined as a result of the reforms of Gorbachev. The policy of demokratizatsiya had already enabled political legitimacy for secessionist movements in their strive for independence. Gorbachev had already acknowledged the inability to maintain the cohesion of the current Union by July of 1991. During July, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and other leaders of the republics had attempted to work on a New Union Treaty to replace the Soviet Union. The key elements were voluntary membership for the republics, republican sovereignty in terms of jurisdiction, devolved taxation, and limited central bodies.

The fact that Gorbachev encouraged voluntary membership would force him to accept the increasing number of claims for independence among the republics.<sup>60</sup> The August Coup is therefore regarded as the coup de grâce as it accelerated the collapse of an already disintegrating empire.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid p.24

<sup>59</sup> Ibid p.16

<sup>60</sup> Galeotti p.114

## Discussion

The collapse of the Soviet Union should be regarded as an intricate process. It is no coincidence that this extended essay has examined both the main reforms of Gorbachev and factors contributing to the collapse. These factors should not be regarded as mutually exclusive in the causation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason is that all factors are related to the three perspectives that have been explored: economic, social, and political. To narrow it down further, all factors relate to economic strain, social unrest, and loss of political cohesion. Understanding the interplay between these factors for the causation of the fall of the Soviet Union is crucial.

When examining the fall of the Soviet Union, it is inevitable to sooner or later stumble upon a discussion of Gorbachev's main reforms. The reason being that the main reforms of Gorbachev rather contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union rather than preventing it. American historian Keeran and American labor economist Kenny argued that Gorbachev accelerated the country into a system-wide crisis.<sup>61</sup> British historian Brown argued that preservation of the Union at its current size was rendered unlikely by the reforms of Gorbachev.<sup>62</sup> Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy researcher Pravda argued that the liberal turn exacerbated pressure within the USSR.<sup>63</sup>

Their background and school of thought are important to consider as the fall of the Soviet Union is not only a discussion of history, but that of economics, sociology, and

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<sup>61</sup> Keeran & Kenny p.88

<sup>62</sup> Brown p.340

<sup>63</sup> Pravda p.22

other social sciences. Despite their difference in academic backgrounds and schools of thought, an underlying consensus among the academic scholars throughout this extended essay is that the main reforms of Gorbachev to varying extent either caused the collapse or accelerated it. However, the purpose of this extended essay is not to determine to what extent the main reforms of Gorbachev contributed to the collapse. It has been established that why the Soviet Union collapsed despite Gorbachev's main reforms is that they had the opposite effect. Therefore it has to be understood how.

The economic policies of uskorenje and perestroika resulted in a budget deficit, decline of economic growth, loss of revenue, and rise in inflation. Uskorenje and perestroika together with a flourishing second economy, loss of export revenues, the reliance on foreign grain imports, and the extensive military spending of the Soviet-Afghan War, caused the Soviet Union to experience severe economic strain. The social policy of glasnost intensified separatism within the Union, encouraged discussion of past persecution, and allowed for foreign influence. Glasnost accompanied the Soviet-Afghan War, which resulted in further separatism and loss of public confidence, resulting in social unrest and lack of cohesion between the republics. Furthermore, the political policy of demokratizatsiya and its implementation of democratic aspects resulted in the previously unimaginable opportunity for nationalities to vote in their cause and strive for independence. Demokratizatsiya and the August Coup, shifting the power from Gorbachev, served as the final blow to the political cohesion of the Soviet Union.

To relate back to the interplay between the reforms of Gorbachev and factors contributing to collapse, it is important to consider why the reforms failed. The

second economy, oil price, grain reliance, and the Soviet-Afghan War should not be regarded as merely other factors contributing to the collapse. These factors, among others, that this essay has been unable to take into account, were the previous existing circumstances that Gorbachev had to manage. The Soviet Union experienced economic strain, social unrest, and loss of political cohesion before Gorbachev came to power. These preexisting factors rendered reform difficult if not impossible.

## Conclusion

Now, **why did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapse despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introducing a series of reform programs (1985-1991)?** This extended essay in history has established that the reform programs contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union rather than preventing it. However, they were not the sole cause. The main reforms, with factors contributing to collapse, exacerbated economic strain, social unrest, and loss of political cohesion. As a result of these economic, social, and political aspects, the Soviet Union collapsed.

Though would this suggest that the rethinking of Gorbachev was a mistake? The rethinking of Gorbachev should not be regarded as a mistake. His attempt to transform a totalitarian state on the path of democracy led to the republics and Eastern Europe being able to choose their path. On an international scale, the fall of the Soviet Union led to the end of the Cold War and a reduction to the threat of nuclear disaster. But shouldn't Gorbachev nonetheless be regarded as the person at fault for the collapse? To answer this question, examine the following quotation by Gorbachev regarding the impact of his policies: "last but not least, they contributed to consolidating the foundations of peace throughout the world".<sup>64</sup> Perhaps the collapse should not be regarded as his fault but as his merit.

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<sup>64</sup> Gorbachev p.216

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